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By ProBox and GAPAC
A content analysis revealed that public, private, and “alternative” media in Mexico primarily amplified content related to the U.S. embargo, humanitarian aid, and regional solidarity. Although the crisis on the island was covered, the dominant narrative focused on sanctions and the energy blockade; meanwhile, issues such as political prisoners, the services crisis, and the Cuban government’s internal responsibilities received little or no coverage.
The data shows that the digital conversation about Cuba in Mexico peaked following Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s call to donate through an association: “Humanidad con América Latina A.C.” (Humanity with Latin America, Inc.).
Cuba in the Mexican Media Conversation
Between January 5 and April 24, 2026, we analyzed posts about Cuba on X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok from 16 Mexican public, private, and “alternative” media outlets. During that period, these outlets published 31,465 pieces of content, of which 8,249 addressed international topics and 985 were related to Cuba, equivalent to 11.94% of all the international conversation analyzed.
The sample included media outlets with a sustained presence in Mexico’s digital political discourse, frequent coverage of foreign policy and Latin America, and links, affinities, or recurring participation within media and political spaces associated with the Mexican left and the ruling party. **
The media outlets analyzed were:
Although Cuba did not dominate the overall agenda of these media outlets, it did occupy a significant place in their international coverage.
Private media led with 40.30% of mentions regarding Cuba (397), closely followed by alternative media with 36.65% (361), while state-run media ranked third with 23.05% (227).
Notable examples include Infodemia MX, a state-run outlet that devoted 33.3% of its total international coverage to Cuba, while the alternative outlet Polemón devoted 28.57%. Other outlets such as the alternative Julio Astillero (24.72%), the state-run Canal Catorce (19.13%), and the alternative Los Reporteros MX (16.14%) also show a significantly high presence. Even in media outlets with broader coverage and a higher volume of publications, such as the private outlets La Jornada (20.10%) and Contralínea (12.25%), Cuba maintains consistent visibility compared to other global issues.
In absolute terms, La Jornada recorded the highest number of Cuba-related posts with 158 mentions, followed by SDP Noticias (123), El Soberano (110), Julio Astillero (109), Canal Catorce (88), and Sin Censura TV (83).
The conversation was concentrated primarily on YouTube, which accounted for 55.43% of the posts and served as the main platform for interviews, geopolitical analysis, and political discussion panels. X accounted for 21.83% and Facebook for 20.10%, primarily for political amplification, dissemination of official statements, and narrative confrontation. With a minimal presence, Instagram (1.93%) served as an emotional showcase, and TikTok (0.71%) as a space for educational summaries of news from the island.
Blockade, Solidarity, and Crisis: How Cuba’s Situation Is Reported
Beyond the volume of coverage, the main finding of the analysis relates to the approach used to explain the Cuban crisis.
A significant portion of the content studied—the U.S. embargo, sanctions, and the energy blockade—emerged as the predominant explanation for the island’s economic and social deterioration. In parallel, support from the Mexican government was presented primarily through a humanitarian, diplomatic, and regional solidarity lens.
In contrast, issues related to political prisoners, repression, state surveillance, social control, human rights violations, and the Cuban government’s internal responsibility had a significantly lower presence in the media coverage analyzed.
No relevant mentions were recorded regarding repression in Cuba, political violence, state surveillance, social control, power outages on the island, or popular discontent.
Private media outlets such as La Jornada linked power outages and medicine shortages to the U.S. embargo, while programs on SinEmbargo and Contralínea addressed the energy crisis primarily through the lens of U.S. pressure and economic sanctions, framing the energy crisis as part of a “strangulation” strategy promoted by Donald Trump and used by the Mexican right-wing to attack the Sheinbaum administration.
In state media, humanitarian aid carried particular weight; “humanitarian aid” accounted for 34% of their keywords related to Cuba, with 63 mentions focused on the idea of cooperation and institutional support. Examples of this: Canal Once and TV Migrante presented Mexican support for Cuba as part of the country’s diplomatic and sovereign tradition in the face of external threats.
In the alternative media, Cuba most often served as a rhetorical symbol within the Mexican political debate. Although these outlets generated the most coverage of the island, nearly 78% of their mentions consisted of general contextual references, without any in-depth thematic analysis. In these outlets, the Cuban issue served to confront opposition figures following López Obrador’s public reappearance, defend the legitimacy of “Humanidad con América Latina A.C.,” and dismiss criticism of aid sent to the island. Sin Censura TV, Polemón, and Julio Astillero are examples of this dynamic.
Although the coverage was not identical across media outlets, it did show similar narrative patterns: a focus on the embargo, an emphasis on regional solidarity, and a lesser presence of topics related to repression and the Cuban government’s internal responsibilities.
“Humanity with Latin America, Inc” and the Peak of the Conversation about Cuba
The conversation about Cuba reached its peak in March 2026 following the public emergence of “Humanidad con América Latina A.C.,” (Humanity with Latin America, Inc.) an association created to channel aid to the island. According to tax records cited by several media outlets, the association was formally incorporated on February 17 and received authorization as a tax-exempt organization from the SAT on March 9 of the same year—a timeframe significantly shorter than the average reported for comparable civil society organizations.
The organization gained significant visibility after Andrés Manuel López Obrador reemerged from his retreat on March 14 asking for donations for Cuba using the association’s bank account.
Following the message, posts about Cuba reached their highest peak for the entire period analyzed. Between March 16 and 17, mentions peaked at 61 posts in a single day.
Alternative digital media were the first to react, and the topic was subsequently amplified by state-run and private outlets.
Coverage focused primarily on supporting the initiative, legitimizing the shipment of aid, defending Mexican foreign policy, and portraying Cuba as a victim of the blockade and external pressure.
Although López Obrador presented it as an initiative driven by “citizens, writers, and journalists,” its members and promoters include figures linked to the political, intellectual, and media circles close to the Obrador camp, including longtime contributors to La Jornada such as Carmen Lira, Pedro Miguel, Luis Hernández Navarro, and Rafael Barajas “El Fisgón,” Gonzalo Rocha, and José Hernández, as well as figures like Elena Poniatowska and Enrique Semo.
Even though there is no public evidence of comparable irregularities, it is impossible not to recall precedents such as the “Por los Demás” trust fund, created by AMLO following the 2017 earthquakes and subsequently investigated by the INE after it detected suspicious transactions carried out by individuals linked to the Morena party.
Cross-Media Circulation
The media outlets analyzed formally belong to different categories but the investigation found a recurring circulation of journalists, analysts, and communicators among print media, public television, digital platforms, and spaces for political discussion. Far from functioning as isolated ecosystems, many of these actors appear simultaneously in different media outlets, participate in cross-platform interviews, share analysis spaces, and coincide both in political initiatives and in institutional settings such as presidential conferences.
This overlap was also reflected in “Humanidad con América Latina A.C.,” where figures with an active media presence converged and subsequently amplified the conversation about Cuba. Among them are longtime contributors to La Jornada such as Julio Hernández López, Luis Hernández Navarro, and Rafael Barajas “El Fisgón”, who also appears on programs on Canal Once and Canal 22 and directs Morena’s Institute for Political Education. They also appear as signatories of the association’s founding charter.
The network of relationships also includes journalists from alternative digital media outlets who, while not formally part of the association, maintain regular ties with these platforms. Álvaro Delgado and Daniela Barragán host key programs on SinEmbargo MX while also contributing to public television (Canal Once and Canal 22). For his part, Héctor Alejandro Quintanar divides his work between SinEmbargo, La Jornada, and the program “Entre Líneas” on Capital 21, while Meme Yamel combines his role as editor-in-chief of The México News with content for SinEmbargo and his own political analysis channel.
This overlap also appears in the political and institutional spheres. Antonio Attolini Murra, for example, has been linked to El Soberano, where he chaired its editorial board, and is currently a congressman for Morena.
Added to this is the recurring presence of media outlets and journalists aligned with the ruling party at presidential press conferences. An investigation by Animal Político identified outlets such as El Soberano, Sin Censura TV, El Chapucero, and Polemón within the ecosystem of media and journalists who frequently participate in the “Mañanera del Pueblo,” which reinforces their visibility and ability to amplify their message within the public discourse.
More than a centralized structure or identical content, the analysis shows how these connections can operate at different levels—organizational, media, and discursive—to reinforce and amplify certain narratives within the Mexican public discourse on Cuba.
The Cuban crisis seen from within
The emphasis on humanitarian aid and regional solidarity in the media sources analyzed also overlooks other tensions related to the destination, management, and distribution of such aid. Recent reports have ranged from complaints by Mexican businesspeople who claim to have been pressured to finance shipments to Cuba, to questions about internal food controls, after the Food Monitor Program accused GAESA before the United Nations of restricting Cubans’ access to food. Added to this is the fact that the Cuban regime itself announced in February that the aid sent by Mexico would be distributed in only four provinces, while journalistic investigations reported that some of those products had ended up being sold in dollar stores. In this context, the prevailing narrative observed in these Mexican media outlets contrasts with recent assessments conducted within Cuba.
According to a survey presented by elTOQUE in May 2026, 94% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the Cuban political system, 96% considered structural changes necessary, and 80.1% supported a transition toward liberal democracy and a market economy. The lack of freedoms also emerged as the main problem identified, at 82.2%.
This contrast highlights a significant difference between the prevailing narratives in much of the Mexican coverage and the perceptions expressed by segments of the Cuban public, where the focus was more on internal problems such as the lack of freedoms, institutional decay, and the need for political change.
** Methodological Note
The selection of media outlets for this study was based on their institutional nature, editorial track record, and relationship with the Mexican government’s media ecosystem.
State-run media (Canal Once, Canal Catorce, Canal 22, TV Migrante, Altavoz Radio/Punto de Referencia, and Infodemia MX) were included because they are part of the Mexican State Public Broadcasting System, making them relevant channels for disseminating the federal administration’s priorities and narratives.
In the case of private media outlets (La Jornada, Contralínea, SDP Noticias, and SinEmbargo), their relevance within the national news ecosystem was considered, as well as the political ties, ideological affinities, or public relations identified between their key editorial figures and the political movement led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador. These media outlets generally maintain favorable coverage of the government and its main initiatives.
Alternative media outlets (El Chapucero, El Soberano, Julio Astillero, Los Reporteros MX, Polemón, and Sin Censura TV) were selected for their role within the digital ecosystem aligned with the Fourth Transformation. Their recurring participation in the presidential press conferences known as “mañaneras,” as well as their presence in communication forums promoted by the ruling party and by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, such as the First Continental Meeting of Independent Communicators, positions them as key players in the circulation of narratives aligned with the government.
