es 
Recent presidential elections in Venezuela that resulted in Nicolás Maduro being declared the winner with a contested 51.20% of the votes sparked a wave of outrage and protests both in Venezuela and abroad. Venezuelan citizens and the international community rose up against what many consider to be blatant fraud. Rather than de-escalating the crisis, the regime moved to intensify repression both online and on the streets.
Prior to these, censorship had already pushed many Venezuelans to rely on social media and messaging apps to access independent news and to report abuses. After July 28, when citizens and the media doubled down on the use of online spaces to document what the opposition and international community consider to be the official election results, the Maduro regime adapted its approach: social networks, previously used as tools of propaganda, began to be weaponized to denounce dissident voices.
ProBox, DFRLab, and DDIA examined how the state’s communication apparatus transformed online spaces from a medium of manipulation into an instrument of repression. This analysis reveals a multi-platform operation to control information, fiercely attacking those who expressed their will on July 28 and demanded transparency.
Prelude: Social Networks on Election Day (July 28)
Over the past two decades, chavismo’s control over Venezuela’s information ecosystem has resulted in at least 408 media outlets being closed since 2003. Venezuela’s opposition and independent media, censored in traditional outlets, sought refuge on social networks and in digital spaces even as these also became targets of the regime (more than 60 sites have been blocked by Conatel over the years).
Over time, the regime has intensified its online repression, using disinformation and stigmatization to target those who spoke out against it.
Despite these challenges, on July 28, Venezuelans relied heavily on social networks and messaging apps during the electoral process, as evidenced by a record number of sociopolitical hashtags and a shift in conversation from positive to negative after Nicolás Maduro’s victory was announced.
Chapter I: Maduro’s “Peace”
With Elvis Amoroso’s declaration that Maduro had won the July 28 elections (Amoroso is a Maduro loyalist and the current head of the country’s National Electoral Council, the CNE), Venezuela awoke to a sense of discontent manifesting online and on the streets.
Beginning on the morning of July 29, Venezuelans in Caracas and across the country had already begun to show their discontent by banging pots and pans, a popular form of protest in the region. By noon, the first spontaneous protests had been recorded, with people refusing to accept the result announced by the CNE (hours earlier), in which – according to data that has not been corroborated by any independent body – Nicolás Maduro was proclaimed the winner of the electoral process. Results refuted by the Comando Con Vzla and the Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (United Democratic Platform), assuring that the electoral triumph corresponded to candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia.
The state’s response against citizens since then has been excessive and alarming. Resulting in, as of August 18, in a total of 24 deaths and 1,503 “verified and identified” arrests, according to data by the Penal Forum.
In this context, the hashtags #Paz (#Peace) and #Justicia (#Justice) were harnessed by Venezuela’s various government entities (military and non-military) to push a false narrative of “calm” that actually disguised their use of repressive tactics to instill fear and unease among the regime’s critics.
The peace narrative is not new, nor is it limited to the post-electoral context. This discourse has been present throughout 2024 and, the trends positioned in X show it. The first hashtag is from January 4, promoted by the Ministry of People’s Power for Communication and Information (MIPPCI, for its acronym in Spanish), which usually coordinates the response of various institutional actors, and the “twitter troops”, was #PuebloEstableYEnPaz (#StableAndPeacefulPeople) with approximately 31,397 tweets.
Diosdado Cabello, vice-president of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV, for its acronym in Spanish), former director of the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel, for its acronym in Spanish), former president of the National Assembly, former minister of several portfolios, has also been promoting the “peace” narrative with tags such as #ConChávezYNicolásPorLaPaz (#WithChávezAndNicolásForPeace) with more than 11,730 tweets.
In fact, on election day, MIPPCI promoted #VotaPorLaPaz2024 (“Vote fot the peace 2024”) with more than 64,600 tweets, and the next day continued its narrative with #GanóLaPazYLaEsperanza (“Peace and hope won”) with a photo of Maduro smiling after voting. The latter gathered 50,600 tweets.
This was used the week after the elections, along with the term “justice,” promoted by MIPPCI, Governors, Ministers, and especially, accounts belonging to Venezuela’s military leadership, including the General Commander of the Strategic Operational Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB, for its acronym in Spanish), Domingo Hernández Lárez.
The same hashtag (#PuebloDeJusticia or #JusticeForThePeople) was used by MIPPCI to affirm “Venezuela, country of Peace!” and by the General Commander of the GNB to show the detention of women who, according to him and with no proof, are part of “sleeping cells of the violence committees” with “terrorist” intentions.
In the case of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), these were quickly aligned with the larger “peace” discourse, while unusual behavior was detected in the responses to Elio Estrada Paredes (General Commander of the GNB). Highlighting cases in X where the number of responses to videos of Maduro or associated with persecution was much higher than the number of “likes”. Reviewed in detail, these also contained almost identical repeated messages from accounts with few followers, same case with the GNB account. Identifying between July 2 and August 5, 396 accounts in X that made publications using the phrase “guarantors of peace”.
But it was not only military institutions that lined up under the “peace” narrative to criminalize protesters.
Publications on July 29 from the Ministry of People’s Power for Productive Agriculture and Lands on Instagram and Facebook, used the hashtag #Paz (“peace”) and quoted Maduro claiming that “80% of the protesters have criminal records, some come from the United States” and that “90% of the captured (…) are in an advanced state of drug addiction, carry weapons, and confess that they are being paid per day.”
Under the same hashtag, a post was also found on an account called “paz_de_venezuela“ on Instagram on August 3, showing the participation of the governor of the state of Carabobo, Rafael Lacava, one of the states with the highest rates of repression in post-election protests, in the “Congress for peace, dialogue, and encounter.”
Maduro also used “#Paz (#Peace)” on TikTok with an excerpt from the “Permanent and Joint Session of the State Council and the National Defense Council.” In it, he calls Edmundo González Urrutia a coward and claims that the opposition was responsible for “installing new criminal gangs with drugs, money, and weapons.” As of August 15, this post had more than 4.7 million views, 66,000 likes, 40,300 comments, 5,846 saves, and 4,418 shares.
This was replicated on Facebook by other officials, such as by the governor of the state of Portuguesa, Primitivo Cedeño, and the mayor of Valera, in the state of Trujillo, Angie Quintana.
On the afternoon of July 29, we also identified the trend “#ComanditosDelTerror,” with around 19,000 messages on X led by Diosdado Cabello’s program and the more radical government supporters, asserting that these (the comanditos) were responsible for “the violence experienced throughout the day in the country.”
Part of the premise used by the government regarding the “vandal acts” rejecting the results announced by the CNE and demanding their official publication is linked to the “Comanditos” of the With Venezuela Command, which is the national campaign organization movement linked to Edmundo González, led by María Corina Machado.
This was used in conjunction with “#CárcelParaLaSayona (#JailForTheSayona),” a smear campaign coordinated by the same group on the same day, this time demanding that María Corina Machado be arrested. The campaign contained at least 11,000 messages. These posts also referred to the “Comanditos” as “fascist,” “guarimberos,” and “violent” groups.
However, figures from the Penal Forum reveal a different picture. The NGO counts among the detained 129 adolescents, 14 indigenous people, 18 people with disabilities, and 200 women. The list also includes journalists, photographers, lawyers, human rights activists, and opposition political leaders.
DDIA also monitored explicit cases in which opposition members were pejoratively classified, on public accounts and profiles, as fascists and terrorists. The official page of the Valencia City Hall in Facebook, a government entity in Venezuela, shared two videos on July 31 (here and here) in which it calls “terrorist commandos” protesters who are seen overturning vehicles. However, these recordings have not been verified by independent sources capable of certifying if they are current or old videos or if they actually took place in that location.
On X, terms like “fascistas guarimberos” were also identified by ProBox in comments under messages published by TeleSUR journalist Madelein García. In one, she is seen participating in a military deployment on the night of July 29 in El Cementerio in Caracas.
On YouTube, DFRLab collected data from 1,564 videos between July 28 and August 4, detecting campaigns and posts that adhered to the government narrative. DFRLab also analyzed a list of the 15 channels with the most videos published about the protests and the regime’s repressive operation, finding that 6 of the most active were those directly linked to the regime or showing some support for Maduro. The accounts that supported the regime used institutional language to amplify Maduro’s orders on denouncing and arresting those protesting in the streets using terms like “VenApp”, “guarimba fascista”, “comandito terrorista, “comandito criminal” or “Candelita que se prenda” (“VenApp,” “fascist guarimba,” “terrorist commandito,” “criminal commandito,” or “Spark that catches fire.”
On YouTube, DFRLab collected data from 1,564 videos between July 28 and August 4, detecting campaigns and posts that adhered to the government narrative. DFRLab also analyzed a list of the 15 channels with the most videos published about the protests and the operation, finding that 6 of the most active were those directly linked to the regime or showing some support for Maduro. The accounts that supported the regime used institutional language to amplify Maduro’s orders on denouncing and arresting those protesting in the streets using terms like “VenApp”, “guarimba fascista”, “comandito terrorista, “comandito criminal” or “Candelita que se prenda” (“VenApp,” “fascist guarimba,” “terrorist commandito,” “criminal commandito,” or “Spark that catches fire.”
Screenshot of the video uploaded by Luigino Bracci Roa from Venezuela where “commanditos” are described as “criminals” and “violent” (yellow boxes). The video was originally broadcast by VTV (green box), to which YouTube suspended three channels in 2020. Source: YouTube
In an international press conference on August 2, Nicolás Maduro went further by directly accusing the “comanditos” of being armed groups. “These criminals are already being hunted,” he said at the time.
This statement preceded a considerable, exponential, and alarming increase in the use of digital tools for persecuting dissent in the country.
What are the “comanditos”?
The “Comanditos con Venezuela” are citizen groups, each composed of at least ten people, operating under the Comando Con Venezuela. These groups, which do not receive funding from actors outside of Venezuela despite claims made by Maduro, were tasked with assuring the process was free and fair by being and accompanying witnesses and poll workers as they performed their duties, and reporting-out about the process to communities. Their role expanded to transmitting records to the opposition Command, allowing the results to be revealed despite resistance from the CNE.
A report by the Coalición Informativa (C-Informa) reveals a campaign by the Chavista regime against the “comanditos”, involving cybercrime, identity changes, and the use of security forces to sow fear and repression. The campaign, which spread through social networks and messaging apps like WhatsApp, used violent language and disinformation to label the comanditos as terrorists. Additionally, an update to VenApp facilitated the reporting of opposition members, intensifying the persecution of critical voices and increasing fear among activists. (The next study in this three-part series dives more deeply into this case.)
What is the regime’s strategy?
Generating fear to immobilize citizen protests, both on the streets and on social media, was one of the main objectives of the disinformation campaign surrounding the comanditos. According to specialists, this strategy began long before the elections.
Jeanfreddy Gutierrez, the editorial coordinator of Cocuyo Chequea, divides this strategy into two parts. The first aimed to discredit, minimize, and invalidate the comanditos, assuring that there were many less formed than announced. “Later, the narrative was to point out that these community organizations were not born to take care of votes but to generate violence and terrorism, for which the accounts that infiltrated and pretended to be opposition, were transformed into “Guarimbas Hunters” that accused and pointed out those who were involved in protests or had been electoral witnesses as responsible for acts of vandalism”, Gutierrez pointed out.
Héctor Rodriguez, the coordinator of Medianalisis, stated, “Citizen protest has been criminalized in the country for many years. The novelty now is that it is being criminalized virtually, and there is a reality that is transgressing the law and is incredibly causing more fear: that citizen protest is being more repressed by officials who are using a photo on your phone, a tweet, or a social media post to repress.”
Despite the arrests, forced disappearances, and threats, such as the terrifying videos of Operation Knock Knock (“Operación Tun Tun” in Spanish) or the blocking of X, Gutierrez believes that mass digital expression has not yet been stifled. This suggests that “many may be afraid, but it is difficult for all of us to be afraid at the same time.”
