Nicolás Maduro Deepens War Rhetoric on Social Media Alongside Cuba and Nicaragua

Nicolás Maduro Deepens War Rhetoric on Social Media Alongside Cuba and Nicaragua

Published on 17 Dec 2025

*Regional dictatorships claim that their alliance is not only ideological but also exists in the military and defensive sphere.

**The waves of repression in Venezuela, following the electoral fraud and Maduro’s swearing-in, were accompanied by a disinformation campaign, according to ProBox analysis.

Investigation conducted by ProBox and Expediente Público

On January 10, 2025, Nicolás Maduro was sworn in as reelected president of Venezuela, after elections in which the CNE proclaimed him the winner without showing the certificates that verified this result. His swearing-in took place amidst the opposition’s denunciation of fraud, led by María Corina Machado, who, with records in hand, claimed that Venezuelans had democratically chosen Edmundo González as the new president, while the country experienced great anticipation about González’s possible arrival to assume the presidency.

Thus, a day before the proclamation, the Maduro regime continued its wave of repression, instilling fear among citizens through the temporary detention of María Corina Machado as she left the gathering called by democratic forces in Caracas; this detention was quickly countered through an influence operation that crossed Venezuelan borders and activated the national and international disinformation ecosystem through regime-allied media.

In the midst of this atmosphere of expectation, on January 10, in the Elíptico Hall of the Federal Legislative Palace, Maduro swore to defend the constitution, while the international community denounced the repression and human rights violations suffered by Venezuelan citizens who were imprisoned, persecuted, and subjected to what the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) described as “state terrorism.” On that day, among the few leaders who accompanied him were Díaz-Canel and Daniel Ortega, both authoritarian leaders of their countries, which, along with Venezuela, are classified as “Not Free” by Freedom House.

The presence of the main representatives of the Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes at the inauguration not only implied political support for the Venezuelan regime, but also military backing, aligning with Chavismo’s strategy of instilling terror among the population through repression, censorship, and the deployment of police and military forces across the country.

A day after the inauguration, Nicolás Maduro declared at the II World Festival of the Anti-Fascist International (in Caracas) that they were preparing, together with Cuba and Nicaragua, to take up arms and defend the right to peace and sovereignty. “We are not timid leaders, we are the Bolivarian Revolution,” he said in a speech.

The narrative of political-military support from Nicaragua and Cuba with Venezuela spread rapidly on social media. Both official media portals and government spokespeople, as well as proxy media, disseminated the message in which the three countries would support each other “with arms” to defend Maduro’s new government.

Amid his swearing-in, Nicolás Maduro sought to impose the idea that he had the power of arms against any threat of invasion or destabilization, a threat amplified on social media and backed by Cuba and Nicaragua as allies willing to defend his position in Miraflores.

ProBox tracked the digital conversation in Venezuela around terms such as: «Juramentación Nicolás Maduro», «Proteger la soberanía de Venezuela», «Defender la soberanía», «Fusión popular militar policial», «Gran escudo de la patria», «#EscudoBolivarianoPorLaPaz», «#EscudoBolivariano2025», «Combatientes para Venezuela», «Apoyo militar a Venezuela», «Apoyo militar de Cuba y Nicaragua», among others.

The results showed broad dissemination of the narrative of power and military strength, which extended beyond January 10 (the day of the swearing-in) and reached its peak on January 23, the date commemorating the end of Marco Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorship in 1958 and the country’s transition to democracy. On this date, accounts largely linked to police and military organizations published military exercises as a demonstration of their strength and control of arms in the country.

With a total of 2,214 mentions, and with X (formerly Twitter) as the main dissemination channel (42.32% of mentions) despite being blocked in the country, the Maduro regime amplified its narrative through support from government accounts, cabinet members, and affiliated media.

The accounts that stood out were:

  • VEN 911: from the alternate X account of the government emergency service, which disseminates official information and government propaganda, it registered the highest number of mentions with 52.
  • CEOFANB: The Operational Strategic Command of the Venezuelan National Armed Forces generated 21 mentions.
  • TVFanb Redes: The television channel of the Venezuelan National Armed Forces generated 6 mentions.
  • Con El Mazo Dando: The pro-government television program and social media account, hosted by Diosdado Cabello (Minister of Interior and Justice), generated 21 mentions.
  • Carmen Meléndez: current mayor of Libertador municipality, generated 6 mentions.
  • Domingo Hernández Lárez: Operational Strategic Commander of the FANB, generated 5 mentions.
  • Karina Capio: current governor of Aragua state, generated 4 mentions.
  • Globovisión: this open television channel was responsible for 17 mentions.
  • El Universal: this Venezuelan newspaper generated 17 mentions online around the narratives studied.
  • Venezolana de Televisión (VTV): the state television channel generated 5 mentions.

Also notable were accounts associated with various state security bodies such as the Bolivarian National Police, CICPC, Integral Defense Operational Zones (ZODI); state governments of La Guaira, Anzoátegui, Falcón, Miranda, Monagas, Bolívar, Amazonas, among other state entities.

Our data shows how state media in authoritarian regimes are the main actors in promoting the narrative of political and military unity among Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to threaten and intimidate dissenters.

Looking at the most repeated hashtags, the relevance of the armed forces in the conversation is clear. While #Venezuela occupied the first place with 266 mentions, #FANB was second with 122; several hashtags reinforced the government’s image as guarantor of stability and peace. #EscudoBolivariano2025 had 154 mentions and #EscudoBolivarianoPorLaPaz had 107, alluding to government defense and security initiatives.

Meanwhile, hashtags like #IntegrarEsVencer (57 mentions) and #SoloUnidosVenceremos (40) reinforced narratives of unity between the government, the people, and the military, further emphasized by #Patria (113 mentions), #patriotismo (39), and #FANBPorLaPatria (39).

The word cloud generated from the data again highlights a focus on civic-military unity in Venezuela, emphasizing terms like «fusión popular militar policial», «popular militar» and «militar policial».

However, examining who posted and what they published during this dynamic provides a better understanding of the intention to convey that the military force was aligned with Nicolás Maduro, and that it received support from foreign allies.

The account of the Operational Strategic Command of the Venezuelan National Armed Forces (CEOFANB), as well as the TV channel account TVFanb Redes, together with the account of the television program hosted by the Minister of Interior and Justice, Diosdado Cabello (Con El Mazo Dando), and the personal social media of the Operational Strategic Commander of the FANB, Domingo Hernández Lárez, stood out as the main content generators.

For example, on January 8, from the X account of Con El Mazo Dando, Diosdado Cabello disseminated a message about the solidity of the “popular-military-police fusion”, linked to the hashtag #TunTunLlegóLaPaz, referring to the so-called Operation TunTun, through which thousands of citizens were arrested in their homes for participating in protests, expressing opinions on social media, being poll workers, or being linked in some way to political organizations of the opposition.

The Venezuelan National Armed Forces (FANB) also disseminated on social media its narrative of support for the Maduro government. The TVFanb account on TikTok posted a video on January 23 showing armed soldiers in a low-income area of Caracas during what was presented as the first “Escudo Bolivariano 2025” exercise for what they described as “defense of peace and democracy.”

@tvfanb

#23Ene || En perfecta Fusión Popular Militar Policial el Pueblo en Armas participa activamente en el primer ejercicio “Escudo Bolivariano 2025” en defensa de la paz y la democracia. La #MiliciaBolivariana bajo la dirección del #CEOFANB, efectua el despliegue Operacional de las Unidades para complementar el Sistema Defensivo Territorial. ¡NUESTRO MÁS ELEVADO TRIUNFO SIEMPRE SERÁ LA PAZ! 𝕄𝕀𝕃𝕀ℂ𝕀𝔸 𝔹𝕆𝕃𝕀𝕍𝔸ℝ𝕀𝔸ℕ𝔸 🇻🇪¡𝗗𝗼‌𝗻𝗱𝗲 𝗲𝗹 𝗣𝘂𝗲𝗯𝗹𝗼 P𝘂𝗲𝗱𝗲, l𝗮 𝗣𝗮𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗮 𝘀𝗲 C𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗲!🇻🇪 @nicolasmaduro @vicevenezuela @padrinovladimir @dhernandezlarez @orlandorromerobolivar @mippcivzla @prensapresidencial @prensa.fanb @ceofanb @vtv_canal8 @tvfanb

♬ sonido original – tvfanb

Meanwhile, accounts of the Integral Defense Strategic Regions (REDI) disseminated military exercises across the country on Instagram and TikTok in support of the sovereignty and government of Nicolás Maduro.

Support between the regimes of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela is not new. In August 2024, during the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) summit, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega publicly reaffirmed that both Nicaragua and Cuba would support Venezuela militarily and paramilitarily, strengthening cooperation among the three countries.

From Cuba’s side, military relations with Venezuela are an open secret dating back to the late Hugo Chávez. A 2019 Reuters report detailed agreements granting Cuba extensive access to Venezuela’s military sector and broad freedom to surveil and reform it. These agreements enabled strict monitoring of Venezuelan troops through an intelligence service, known as the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM).

Under Cuban military guidance, Venezuela restructured its intelligence units into a service that spies on its own armed forces, instilling fear and paranoia, persecuting, exiling, and imprisoning dissenters. Cuban military advisory continued after Chávez’s death, and Maduro’s statement about receiving arms support from Cuba and Nicaragua reflects this collaboration.

Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua’s communication apparatus closed ranks around the civic-military support for Maduro’s swearing-in on January 10, 2025, for his third term. ProBox analyzed online conversations between January 1–31, observing coordinated dissemination of the same narrative through state media and government entities in each country.

In Cuba, 2,110 mentions were generated around keywords such as:

  • “Juramentación Nicolás Maduro – Cuba”
  • “Miguel Díaz Canel y Nicolás Maduro”
  • “Díaz Canel en Caracas”
  • “Delegación cubana en Venezuela”
  • “Cuba Proteger la soberanía de Venezuela”
  • “Combatientes cubanos para Venezuela”
  • “Armas de Cuba en Venezuela”
  • “Armas para Venezuela”
  • “Apoyo militar cubano para Venezuela”

At the hashtag level, three stood out regarding the bilateral narrative around Maduro’s swearing-in and Cuban support: #CubaConVenezuela, #Venezuela, #Cuba. Support for Venezuela and Maduro was also reflected in #TodoPorVenezuela and #MaduroPresidente.

Regarding Nicaragua, 150 mentions were recorded, peaking on January 10, the day of Maduro’s swearing-in. Keywords used included:

  • “Juramentación Nicolás Maduro”
  • “Daniel Ortega y Nicolás Maduro”
  • “Daniel Ortega en Caracas”
  • “Delegación de Nicaragua en Venezuela”
  • “El19digital venezolanos defienden soberanía”
  • “Combatientes sandinistas a Venezuela”
  • “No a los imperios sí a la patria bendita”
  • “Militares sandinistas en Venezuela”
  • “Nicaragua defiende Venezuela contrarrevolución”

Cuban conversation mainly occurred on X (67.6%), while Nicaraguan conversation mainly took place on Facebook (54%).

ProBox data show that state media in authoritarian regimes are the main actors promoting the narrative of political-military unity among Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

In Cuba, the main mentions of support narratives for Venezuela came from:

  • Radio Rebelde, state radio station, 10 mentions
  • Radio Habana Cuba, government international radio, 8 mentions
  • Canal Caribe, state TV channel, 5 mentions
  • CubaSí, state news agency, 4 mentions
  • Granma, official Communist Party newspaper, 3 mentions

Government entities also participated:

  • National Assembly of Cuba, 14 mentions
  • Communist Party of Cuba, 8 mentions
  • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, 6 mentions
  • Presidency of Cuba, 6 mentions

Similarly, in Nicaragua, government-affiliated media were significant promoters of the digital narrative around Venezuela. Top contributors:

  • Canal 4 Nicaragua, state TV, 14 mentions
  • TN8, state TV, 11 mentions
  • Viva Nicaragua Canal Trece, state TV, 9 mentions
  • El 19 Digital, government-owned online media, 8 mentions
  • Canal Parlamentario de Nicaragua, National Assembly TV, 6 mentions

Venezuela faces a scenario marked by disinformation narratives and political-military support that reinforce Nicolás Maduro’s regime.

The political and military backing announced by Ortega, along with Cuban influence, demonstrates how Nicaragua and Cuba play a key role in regime stability. This support includes coordination of paramilitary strategies, dissemination of official narratives, and strengthening of international alliances, deepening militarization and restricting freedoms in Venezuela.

The current context reflects a consolidation of alliances among these three countries, where disinformation and military support not only reinforce authoritarian regimes but also generate regional tensions and challenges for democracy in Latin America.

Go to all articles
  • Other related contents

  • 01

    The Laws Closing Civic Space in Latin America: The Most Affected Countries

    A study by Fundamedios and TrustLaw examines how ten Latin American countries have adopted legal frameworks that, while presented as measures to promote transparency or security, have increasingly restricted freedom of association

    Read more
  • 02

    We Launch Micro-Grants to Boost Digital Advocacy in Latin America

    Applications open from August 5 to 20!

    Read more
  • 03

    International Day of Democracy 2022: 7th Edition of DemoTech International

    Transparencia Electoral, DemoTech and DemoAmlat announce that the VII Edition of DemoTech International will be held this coming September 15 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, with the support of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

    Read more
  • Subscribe

    Subscribe to our weekly newsletter

    Subscribe