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What do an average citizen living in Kyiv and another residing in Managua have in common? Although thousands of kilometers and distinct cultural realities separate them, today both may be subject to heightened forms of surveillance that share similar technologies, logic, and legal frameworks. In Russia and Nicaragua, these mechanisms point in the same direction: to deter criticism, shape the public narrative, and contain dissent. And, when that is not enough, simply shut down the internet.
This cooperation between the two countries regarding surveillance and control of communications is not new: it has been consolidating for years. While the Russian government provides technology and advice to Daniel Ortega’s regime, Nicaragua has been offering territory (both on the ground and in space) for the installation of infrastructure linked to satellites and navigation systems since 2015.
At the same time, various legal frameworks reinforce this logic of control. The recent reform of Russia’s “Communications” law allows the internet to be shut down at any time; while in Nicaragua, the entry into force last year of the General Law on Convergent Telecommunications strengthens surveillance and intervention across the entire digital ecosystem.
Today, citizens of Russia and Nicaragua move through their cities under increasingly sophisticated and strict surveillance, backed by legal frameworks and driven by technology.
SORM-3: The Russian Surveillance System Imported to Managua
Russia has spent decades perfecting its espionage capabilities, and the Nicaraguan regime has replicated many of these practices, incorporating digital tools designed to control critical voices. This transfer involves not only technology but also methods, legal frameworks, and the logic of State surveillance.
Since 2018, the Russian SORM surveillance system has been in use in Managua, often without citizens having a clear understanding of the scope of this monitoring. A report by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, affiliated with the U.S. Department of Defense, notes that the most advanced version of this system (SORM-3) is the one currently used by the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo.
The SORM system is not merely a technological tool but a comprehensive framework that combines infrastructure, regulations, and intelligence capabilities. It was originally developed by the KGB in the late 1980s, and has evolved through different phases: from the interception of telephone calls (SORM-1), through internet monitoring (SORM-2), to SORM-3, which allows not only access to communications but also the processing, filtering, and storage of large volumes of data on users’ digital activity.
Surveillance of citizens abroad: a shared practice
Surveillance in Russia and Nicaragua is not limited to national territory. A report by the UN Human Rights Council documents that Nicaragua’s state surveillance apparatus also operates beyond its borders, through a complex network of intelligence that extends to the diaspora; while in Russia, the reality is not much different.
Starting with Nicaragua, the UN report notes that surveillance of exiles is a structure that combines state actors and networks linked to the Sandinista National Liberation Front, and uses advanced digital technologies to track exiles. These practices include hacking accounts, intercepting communications, systematic monitoring of social media, and the use of spyware. Added to this are coordinated campaigns of digital harassment (including threats, defamation, and doxxing) driven by networks of bots and trolls associated with pro-government structures and the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services, with the aim of damaging reputations and undermining asylum or relocation processes.
The report also describes a multi-tiered intelligence architecture involving security forces, the diplomatic service, and non-state actors, all coordinated under a centralized chain of command headed by Rosario Murillo.
This pattern of surveillance, harassment, and persecution of citizens in exile is a practice that Russia has been employing for years, and which today resembles what is happening in Nicaragua.
The Russian state classifies exiles as “terrorists” or “extremists” to hinder their economic and social survival outside the country. Furthermore, a new bill currently under consideration in the State Duma, titled “On Temporary Restrictive Measures Against Persons Outside the Russian Federation Who Evade Sanctions,” seeks to strip citizenship from those deemed enemies of the state, thereby consolidating a mechanism of extraterritorial repression that finds a parallel in Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega also persecutes and restricts the rights of exiled citizens (as in the case of the more than 317 Nicaraguans stripped of their nationality by the regime in February 2023).
Russian repression has forced thousands of Kremlin critics into exile, but the punishments are not limited to banishment.
Since March 2022, in Russia, journalists convicted in absentia have received prison sentences averaging eight years, and some have been the targets of direct attacks abroad. Cases such as that of Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, sentenced to 14 years in prison in absentia and a survivor of two assassination attempts, or the attacks against researcher Christo Grozev and editor Roman Dobrokhotov, show how convictions in absentia can become a tool to attempt the physical elimination of opponents, beyond the legal sphere.
Strategic Legislation: Strengthening Surveillance in Russia and Nicaragua
Surveillance and control of communications are legalized in both Russia and Nicaragua. The most recent reform passed in Moscow regarding internet control took place in February of this year when the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament) approved, in its second and third readings, an amendment to the federal law “On Communications,” which requires telecommunications companies to suspend internet and telephone services when ordered to do so by the Federal Security Service (FSB). The legislation was signed by President Vladimir Putin on February 20, 2026, and took effect 10 days later.
The law stipulates that operators must comply with orders from security services and, at the same time, exempts them from contractual liability to users for service interruptions resulting from these orders.
Another key point is that the law leaves it up to the President and the Russian government to define the circumstances under which these disconnections may be applied, allowing them to order and “justify” communication blackouts at the local or national level through subsequent decrees.
The legislation formalizes practices that were already taking place in the country. In recent years, various regions of Russia have experienced recurring mobile internet outages, which authorities have explained as security measures against military threats or sensitive events.
Although in a political and technological context different from Russia’s, Nicaragua has moved in a similar direction regarding state control over communications.
On November 6, 2025, the General Law on Convergent Telecommunications (Law 1223) came into effect, having been approved by the National Assembly in October 2024 and published in the official gazette La Gaceta. The law replaced the previous telecommunications law in effect since 1995 and significantly expanded the powers of the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services (TELCOR) over the country’s digital infrastructure.
According to the text, TELCOR becomes the sole regulator of the sector, with authority to regulate, plan, supervise, oversee, and inspect operators, service providers, and platforms operating within the digital ecosystem.
One of the most controversial aspects of the law is the set of provisions requiring telecommunications companies to provide information to the regulator.
Article 110 stipulates that operators must provide TELCOR with “all required information,” including statistical data and georeferenced information on service usage. Such provisions open the door to surveillance systems that allow for tracking users’ communication patterns, location, and online activity.
Although Daniel Ortega’s regime presented the reform as “a necessary modernization to boost connectivity and reduce the digital divide,” Freedom House warned that the scope of the regulations allows technical regulation to be transformed into a tool for political control over communications.
Nicaraguan organizations dedicated to defending freedom of expression and human rights have also expressed concern about the impact of these regulations. The Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy (FLED) has documented in various reports the increase in pressure, threats, and legal proceedings against journalists and communicators, while the “Nicaragua Never Again Human Rights Collective” has warned that the legal framework approved in recent years expands the state’s tools to monitor, persecute, and silence critical voices both inside and outside the country.
Nicaragua’s Convergent Telecommunications Law does not operate in isolation. It is part of a broader legal framework adopted by the Ortega government since 2020 that has expanded the state’s capacity to control the digital space.
Among these laws the Special Law on Cybercrimes (Law 1042) stands out, criminalizing the dissemination of information deemed “false” or that causes “anxiety”—provisions that have been used to persecute journalists, activists, and political opponents.
In addition to these measures, there are other laws, such as the Foreign Agents Act and the Law on the Defense of the People’s Rights to Independence, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, which have served as the legal basis for shutting down civil society organizations, seizing media outlets, and prosecuting government critics.
A Restrictive Model That Works
What is happening in Russia and Nicaragua is not merely a legal or technical adjustment: it is the construction of a model of control that crosses borders, regulates behavior, and redefines online freedom of expression.
From the use of SORM-3 in Managua to the Russian law allowing the FSB to disconnect the internet at will, both regimes have demonstrated that, in the digital age, technology can be as powerful as any army for surveillance, intimidation, and silencing.
In addition to controlling networks and platforms, Russia has exported its model of training and disinformation to Nicaragua, teaching journalism students propaganda and indoctrination techniques. This reinforces a comprehensive authoritarian pattern: the state not only regulates and censors digital infrastructure but also seeks to shape those who produce information, consolidating an ecosystem where communication, education, and political power are closely intertwined.
The lesson is clear: controlling the internet has become as crucial as controlling territory. Transnational surveillance, restrictive laws, and strategic censorship show that these regimes seek not only to limit internal dissent but also to project their influence and fear beyond physical borders.
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