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** At the top is the Presidency, which sets the discursive line; this is followed by pro-government media, and at the base, pages and accounts aligned with Sandinismo that amplify the message on social media to simulate authentic conversations in favor of these governments.
*** The network promotes narratives of “brotherhood” and “cooperation,” activated around commemorative dates and official visits to legitimize the alliance with Beijing.
An investigation by ProBox, Expediente Público, and La Prensa
Every anniversary, official visit, or signing of agreements between Nicaragua and China is accompanied by an intense digital campaign filled with praise for both governments. A network of pro-government media outlets and Sandinista-aligned accounts coordinates the mass dissemination of messages about “friendship,” “cooperation,” and “exchange” as part of a joint strategy to amplify the narratives of both regimes and shield them from criticism through sophisticated censorship mechanisms.
An analysis of Nicaragua’s information ecosystem conducted by ProBox together with Expediente Público and La Prensa reveals that between July 2024 and August 2025 there were spikes in social media activity that coincided with major cooperation events between Managua and Beijing, used to strengthen the digital propaganda discourse of both governments.
During this period, according to the study, Nicaragua recorded 2,246 mentions around keywords such as: “China,” “Nicaragua,” “Taiwan,” “cooperation,” “exchange,” “training,” “brotherhood,” “alliance,” “friendship,” “anniversary,” “diplomatic relations,” “visit,” “forums,” “scholarships,” “development,” and “technological cooperation.”
Key phrases such as “Belt and Road” and “Franja y la Ruta” were also included, directly linked to China’s international strategy related to the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” Beyond promoting infrastructure, investment, and cooperation, these initiatives seek to consolidate political alliances, position favorable narratives in media and social networks, and strengthen strategic ties with “allied” governments or those that do not challenge China’s actions.
And although the Ortega–Murillo regime attempts to make it appear that social media users react to and share propaganda in favor of the People’s Republic of China spontaneously, the investigation reveals the existence of a three-tier hierarchical structure, starting with the Presidency, followed by its media outlets, and then pages aligned with Sandinista discourse.
A Structure Coordinated from the Presidency
On October 5, 2025, the son of the dictatorial duo, Daniel Edmundo Ortega Murillo—media coordinator of the Council of Communication and Citizenship, an entity created by President Daniel Ortega and handed over to Rosario Murillo on January 10, 2007, when he took power—signed an agreement with China Media Group (CMG) to “strengthen the exchange of audiovisual content.”
This Council coordinates communications from public institutions while also establishing the regime’s official narrative through state media and pro-government propaganda outlets owned by the Ortega–Murillo family.
This was not the first time Daniel Edmundo signed communication agreements with China. The first occurred in March 2022, just three months after diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored.
The investigation by ProBox, Expediente Público, and La Prensa shows that there is an institutionalized hierarchy of online propaganda in Nicaragua, headed by the Presidency through the Council of Communication and Citizenship.
In second place are official amplifiers, consisting of pro-government media outlets that reproduce propaganda narratives, such as Channel 4, TN8, Channel 13, El 19 Digital, Radio 580, and JP+. In third place are Sandinista militants or troll accounts such as @Atego16, @RDRFSLN_, @collvermat, and @plomoflr, according to ProBox’s research.
China’s Embassy in Managua also participates in this digital propaganda choreography. According to a review of Meta’s ad library, between January and September 2025, 726 paid ads targeting audiences in Nicaragua were identified, promoted by 229 different pages. These generated between 96.7 and 112.2 million impressions (the number of times content is shown on a user’s screen, regardless of whether the same user sees it multiple times). The total estimated investment reached 2.79 million córdobas (approximately USD 75,700) and included Nicaraguan audiences among its targets.
Among the main advertisers, the Chinese Embassy stands out, having published 89 ads, making it the most active foreign actor in the country. It is followed by official Chinese media such as China Xinhua News, a state agency directly dependent on the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (65 ads); the video game Conflict of Nations: World War 3, with military and geopolitical themes (54 ads); Economic Daily, a media outlet run by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and specializing in economic issues (48 ads); and Global Times, an English-language newspaper affiliated with People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, focused on politics and international relations (19 ads). Although these accounts—except for the Chinese Embassy—did not pay specifically to advertise in Nicaragua, Meta reports that they nonetheless reached audiences within the country.
Who Makes Up the Amplifier Network?
This level represents the second link in Nicaragua’s state propaganda structure and is made up of national media outlets that amplify and reproduce official messages. Among those with the highest volume of mentions are Channel 4, TN8, Channel 13, Radio 580, the El 19 Digital portal—directly managed by the Presidency—and the JP+ platform, all aligned with the regime’s narrative.
Channels 4, 8, and 13, according to investigations by media outlets such as Reuters, La Prensa, and Nicaragua Investiga, are controlled by Juan Carlos, Camila, Luciana, and Maurice Ortega, all children of the ruling couple Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo.
Likewise, the websites El 19 Digital and JP+ in Spanish are part of the propaganda structure the Ortega–Murillo dictatorship has maintained for over a decade.
El 19 Digital is managed by the Presidency. It was launched in print format in 2009 as an “official weekly of the Presidency of Nicaragua.” However, it moved online after its print circulation failed, despite being free.
JP+, or Juventud Presidente, launched in 2011 on X and currently marketed as a website covering “international current affairs,” is also linked to the Sandinista Front and is unofficially known to be administered in coordination with the Managua Mayor’s Office.
X Is Prioritized to Amplify Discourse
The analysis of Nicaragua’s information ecosystem also found that the dictatorship, through its amplifier network, heavily disseminates its discourse on the social network X, with 2,250 mentions (79%), followed by online news outlets with 554 mentions, blogs with 29, and forums with 7.
“Other channels (online news, blogs, forums, and Tumblr) had constant but very low mentions in comparison,” the analysis notes.
Among the X accounts that most reinforced favorable narratives about activities between the People’s Republic of China and Nicaragua during this period were @db_nicaragua, @collvermat, @Atego16, @RDRFSLN_, and @13JulioUNANMGA, linked to the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN–Managua).
The @db_nicaragua profile, confirmed by Expediente Público, corresponds to Diario Barricada, which defines itself as “a historic communication outlet of the FSLN.” This is an official propaganda outlet founded in July 1979 that reemerged only in digital form in June 2018, two months after the outbreak of social protests against the Ortega–Murillo dictatorship.
It is worth noting that Diario Barricada joined X in November 2021 and currently has more than 3,600 followers, including accounts from the Ministry of Education and the pro-government Radio Ya, owned by the Ortega–Murillo family.
Militant Amplifier Profiles on X Emerged After the 2018 Protests
Two additional profiles contributing to the amplification of Beijing and Managua’s narratives, identified in the study, belong to accounts run by two women who do not disclose their names but use photos of their faces on X and are identified only as @Atego16 and @RDRFSLN_.
@Atego16, which joined X in July 2018, describes itself as “An FSLN militant in the service of the people of Nicaragua” and has more than 26,000 followers. The account publicly promotes attendance at political events of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in San Carlos, Río San Juan. Its posts highlight achievements in Nicaragua–China relations, including propaganda related to the arrival of Yutong buses from China.
#Nicaragua 🇳🇮
Llegaron a Managua.. los 250 🚍 provenientes de la hermana república de #China
Unidades q Fortalecerán la red de transporte público, beneficiando a las familias nicaragüenses#UnidosEnVictorias@QuenriM @FloryCantoX pic.twitter.com/m7rOoPRubB
— @🅰🆃🅴🅶🅾 🇳🇮 (@Atego16) November 6, 2023
Somos un Pueblo Victorioso✌🏻
Llegan a #Nicaragua 🇳🇮 250 Buses provenientes de la hermana República de China 🇨🇳 que mejorarán el transporte público#UnidosEnVictorias
📹 @el19digital @FloryCantoX @QuenriM pic.twitter.com/W8MLbo4xy3
— @🅰🆃🅴🅶🅾 🇳🇮 (@Atego16) October 3, 2023
The @RDRFSLN_ account, also featuring a woman’s face, was opened on X in July 2019. It currently has more than 11,000 followers and describes itself as part of “women who, through daily struggle, turn history into a cry of freedom, love, and hope. Women are revolution.” Among its followers is @Atego16.
Another militant helping to spread these messages is Colbert Matamoros, appearing as @collvermat. This account was created in 2012, has more than 12,000 followers, and although it does not display a personal photo, it describes itself as “a Sandinista at heart, disciplined and passionate about work in Nicaragua.”
Traffic Spikes Linked to Cooperation with Media and Universities
The analysis shows that the highest conversation peaks among pages controlled by the pro-government apparatus occurred mainly in July and August 2024 and May 2025, when cooperation events between Chinese and Nicaraguan media outlets and universities were promoted.
Activity on July 22, 2024—widely disseminated by the pro-government network—centered on a meeting between students from UNAN–Managua and the China Media Group, generating 170 mentions, 154 of them on X.
Se desarrolló en Unan Managua el seminario “Oportunidades Globales en la Profundización de la Reforma de China en la Nueva Era”con la participación de la delegación de Medios de China, estudiantes comunicación, ciencias Políticas y Relaciones internacionales y Ciencias Económica pic.twitter.com/7YF53bYid9
— El 19 Digital (@el19digital) July 26, 2024
📍 En el Auditorio Fernando Gordillo de la UNAN-Managua inició este viernes, el seminario "Oportunidades Globales en la Profundización de la Reforma de China en la Nueva Era", impartido y coordinado por representantes del Grupo de Medios de China y la citada universidad. pic.twitter.com/aQV84ThUkj
— El 19 Digital (@el19digital) July 26, 2024
4/5 🌍📚 El Grupo de Medios de China/América Latina realizó el seminario "Oportunidades Globales en la Profundización de la Reforma de China en la Nueva Era". ✊ ♥️🖤✨
📸✨ Galería Fotográfica: Leonardo Duarte pic.twitter.com/vG1QXWljdS
— BARRICADA – Nicaragua (@db_nicaragua) July 26, 2024
Se desarrolló en la Unan #Managua el seminario “Oportunidades Globales en la Profundización de la Reforma de #China en la Nueva Era”, con la participación de la delegación de Medios de China, estudiantes comunicación, ciencias Políticas y Relaciones internacionales y Económicas. pic.twitter.com/dZ4bqZkWja
— Radio 580 Nicaragua (@radio580nic) July 26, 2024
One month later, on August 19, 2024, another event—this time a training program in television production techniques for Channel 6 held in Beijing—generated more than 80 mentions on X.
Comunicadores Sandinistas sostienen intercambio con representantes del Grupo de Medios de China. #Noticiero6 pic.twitter.com/6pTdZjGVIo
— Canal 6 Nicaragua (@Canal6Nicaragua) July 25, 2024
Destacado || #Nicaragua
Nicaragua pronuncia palabras de agradecimiento en seminario sobre transformación digital en Beijín, China https://t.co/kj3noXr1oa— El 19 Digital (@el19digital) August 2, 2024
Comunicadores Sandinistas 🔴⚫📡🎙️ concluyen capacitación comunicacional en #China 🇨🇳. #noticias #nicaragua
Más información 🌐👉🏼 https://t.co/TE6kXX3Hhe pic.twitter.com/yBygZaA1IY
— Canal 4 Nicaragua (@Canal4Ni) June 2, 2025
📌Nicaragua participa en el Festival de Televisión de Shanghai, en la República Popular China 🇨🇳 📺 🇳🇮 #nicaragua #tv #festival #china pic.twitter.com/icqKNJRqIN
— Viva Nicaragua (@VivaNicaragua13) June 24, 2024
In May of the following year, other China-related promotions—this time connected to a global conference on digital education in Wuhan and the visit of Laureano Ortega to the People’s Republic of China—again generated more than 200 combined mentions. According to the joint analysis by Expediente Público, ProBox, and La Prensa, this demonstrates “a strategy designed to generate coordinated digital waves” that appear to follow the model of online propaganda and censorship exported by the Eastern ally.
Each of these episodes was accompanied by waves of posts extolling “brotherhood,” “cooperation,” and “technological modernization,” reinforcing technical capacities for propaganda dissemination while the Ortega–Murillo regime censors independent press outlets—forcing approximately 307 journalists and media workers into exile between April 2018 and September 2025.
Repeated or spam-like messages across militant and official regime posts reiterated slogans related to the “restoration of diplomatic relations with China,” Confucius Institute projects, the Luban Workshop, the arrival of Yutong buses, and visits or arrivals of Chinese delegations in Nicaragua.
Hashtags reinforcing narratives favorable to China as a “strategic, supportive, brotherly ally” were also documented, while primarily framing the United States and internal opposition as “enemies,” labeling them “imperialists,” “mercenaries,” or “traitors.” Identified hashtags include #China, #YankeeGoHome, #UnidosEnVictorias, and #CooperaciónInternacional, framing the narrative within a logic of confrontation with the United States and exaltation of the China–Russia–Venezuela axis.
China’s Discursive Strategy in Nicaragua
Ads paid for by Beijing’s diplomatic mission in Managua and targeted at Nicaraguan audiences contained historical propaganda commemorating events such as China’s Victory Day over Japan or the beginning of the Japanese invasion in 1937, along with messages about modernization, technological progress, and international cooperation and friendship between China and Nicaragua.
In terms of targeting, the data shows ads primarily aimed at young people aged 18 to 34—the most active demographic on social media—distributed across different departments of the country and delivered in Spanish.
Overall, in just nine months, the Chinese Embassy’s ads in Nicaragua generated between 10.6 and 12.5 million impressions, with an estimated investment of USD 5,674.
Political scientist, philosopher, and researcher at the think tank Expediente Abierto, César Eduardo Santos, notes that available data on digital interaction between Nicaragua and China—though “partial and fragmented”—allows for the identification of a clear dynamic in which “interaction between two communication apparatuses—the Nicaraguan pro-government system and the Chinese communication apparatus—tends to mutually reinforce itself.”
Santos warned that these actions do not reflect public conversation or the real weight of these messages compared to other voices, but are instead “self-referential: they describe how these apparatuses speak to each other rather than how they impact the broader social sphere.”
He added that certain elements “connect with public diplomacy and the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy discursive strategy in the region,” including anniversaries used as “propaganda windows” and commemorations tied to the “establishment or restoration of relations with China,” functioning as scheduled visibility peaks.
“In Nicaragua, the script repeats what has been observed in other countries: selective balancing of ‘benefits’ (scholarships, training, technological modernization); staging of brotherhood and political-cultural alignment; and reiteration of the ‘One China’ principle,” Santos stated.
Chinese Propaganda Is Distinctive in Nicaragua
The China Index 2024—an initiative by Doublethink Lab, a Taiwanese civil society organization studying digital authoritarian influence—shows that China’s influence in Nicaraguan media rose from 13.6% in 2022 to 54.6% in 2024, due to the Ortega–Murillo regime’s absolute control over pro-government and state media.
According to researcher Hernán Alberro, in 2022 Nicaraguan media exposure was below the global average of 30%. By 2024, it had reached 54%.
“In 2022 these activities did not exist; in 2024 they did, and in significant volume. No other Latin American country surpasses Nicaragua in the number of journalists invited by China for training and seminars,” Alberro said.
According to the specialist, Chinese propaganda and influence in Nicaragua are distinctive because they are promoted directly through structures responding to Ortega–Murillo regime directives, meaning the People’s Republic of China does not need to exert much effort to disseminate them.
“In Nicaragua there are no real elites. There is a single surname and a group of people aligned vertically with that family. In other countries China seeks to co-opt various elites—academic, political, media, or social—but in Nicaragua it is enough to have the approval of the Ortega couple to operate without resistance,” he argued.
A Propaganda Strategy Designed to Avoid “Debate” or “Criticism”
Researcher Santos emphasized that this network’s digital agenda is clearly activated around dates and events defined by both communication apparatuses, enabling “apparent consensus to be manufactured through repetition and symbolic validation.”
“Although Nicaragua’s cycle of anniversaries is more recent, the pattern aligns with what has been observed in Costa Rica, Panama, and more recently El Salvador: the commemoration structures the communication calendar, pre-sets content agendas, mobilizes allied media, and sets the celebratory tone while simultaneously shielding the geopolitical framing desired by Beijing,” he said.
According to Santos, this strategy also serves a central purpose: “to fix messages and minimize space for counter-narratives regarding Taiwan’s status, reminding public opinion that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Central American countries is one more step toward the ‘reunification’ of the People’s Republic of China.”
“We are not dealing with a horizontal exchange between independent civil societies, but with interactions between a party-state and recipient communities,” he clarified.
The advantage for Beijing, Santos argues, “is twofold”: it “projects modernization and respectability” while “reframing competition with the United States in terms of sovereignty and non-interference.”
Santos concluded that, as shown by the analysis, the conversation driven “from above”—whether by the Nicaraguan or Chinese regime—“is assembled around prefigured events, such as diplomatic anniversaries, and avoids open controversy,” resulting in “a propaganda strategy that seeks to install official narratives rather than debate policy.”
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